by Anne Flood
After spending six weeks recuperating from pleurisy, Brigadier General Chauvel returned to the Gallipoli Peninsula on Tuesday 3rd August 1915 to command the 1st Light Horse Brigade – just in time for the biggest attack since the Landing.
The Plan for the August Offensive
By late July, 1915 there had been little gain for either side since 25th April and it became clear that, if they were going to stay on the Peninsula, the Allies had to try something ‘new’. The battle plan was engineered by General Hamilton, Major-General Godley and Lieutenant-General Birdwood. Godley was given command of the entire assault involving over one hundred thousand men.
The offensive would be fought on a number of fronts. Beginning the 3rd August, 45,000 British reinforcements would land at Suvla Bay and proceed to seize hills in the Sari Bair Range.
On the 6th August British forces at Cape Helles would take diversionary action to keep Turkish divisions tied down at the southern end of the Peninsula. At 5.30pm on the 6th August a diversionary attack would be mounted at Lone Pine by the Australian First Infantry Brigade to divert Turkish troops away from the main action in its North. Other diversionary attack would occur at midnight on the 6th August at Steele’s Post to take the German Officers’ Trench
On the evening of the 6th August two columns would head North along the beach and turn East to scale the heights of the Sari Bair Range. Monash’s 4th Brigade, the British New Army Battalions, and the 29th Indian Brigade under General Cox, would move via Aghyl Dere to take Hill 971 and Hill Q. New Zealand troops under Colonel Johnston and Brigadier-General Russell would move via Rhododendron Ridge and take Chunuk Bair. At 3.30am a Brigade of the New Army force on Chunuk Bair would then move down the southern slopes to attack on the rear of Baby 700, thus forming a converging movement with a frontal attack by Light Horse forces.
Right: AWM H15753 Brigadier General Harry Chauvel, Major General Alexander Godley and Lieutenant General William Riddell Birdwood confer in the open. [1]
At 4.30am on 7th August the 3rd L.H.Brigade under Colonel Frederic Hughes would mount four successive bayonet attacks from Russell’s Top on The Nek and Baby 700 – “these trenches and convergences of communication trenches … require considerable strength to force. The narrow Nek to be crossed … makes an unaided attack in this direction almost hopeless”. [2] Support for the 3rd L.H. Brigade would come from simultaneous break-outs by the 1st L.H.Brigade at Quinn’s and Pope’s onto Deadman’s Ridge and The Chessboard. Success in all areas largely depended on the military closure of the guns at German Officer’s Trench.
The plan was complex: the Northern attacks were mounted at night and in difficult and unfamiliar terrain with razor sharp ridges and deep, winding gorges described by Cox as “the mad country and very difficult”. Unit commanders were not given their orders until the day before the offensive and were not permitted to scout the routes for fear of alerting the enemy.
Commanders were confused regarding the true purpose of individual attacks and, “until the approach of the actual hour – 4.30am on August 7th – for which the frontal attack on Baby 700 was provisionally ordered – it was not clear whether the operation was to form part of a main attack … or was to be merely a feint.”[2]
The Plan for the Attack on Baby 700.
At 4.30am on the 7th August the 8th and 10th Regiments of the 3rd L.H.Brigade would mount four successive bayonet attacks from Russell’s Top on Baby 700, supported by the New Army Infantry Brigade coming down from Chunuk Bair. Two squadrons of the 1st L.H.Regiment and four successive lines of the 2nd L.H. Regiment would mount attack from Pope’s and Quinn’s on the Chessboard and Turkish Quinn’s Post to stop the advance of Turkish troops to the North.
Attacks would be preceded by a half-hour of heavy artillery bombardment from land and sea to batter enemy lines and to keep them in their trenches. Machine and rifle gun fire from the nearby German Officer’s Trench could enfilade the entire Australian front and these enemy trenches had to be shut down.
The Light Horsemen were ordered to use “the cold steel” [bayonets] – Godley’s idea – reminiscent of the attacks conducted fifteen years before in the Boer War. However the Boer War attacks were conducted in open terrain and on horseback and, even then, “it took courage or madness. [3]
It is believed that, in conference with Light Horse Commanding Officers, Birdwood had agreed on two ‘pre-conditions’ for the frontal attack on Baby 700: (1) the taking of German Officers’ Trench and (2) the successful assault on Chunuk Bair. The attack would be preceded by intense bombardment from land and sea batteries right up to 4.30am, the time scheduled for the attack.
For the 1st L.H. Regiment ‘B’ Squadron under Captain Wallace Cox would move via Waterfall on the right to be in position at 4.30am. ‘A’ Squadron under Major James Reid would move via a shorter path on the left and take and hold trenches on the Chessboard. Although shorter the left side was open to fire from the enemy at The Chessboard and the German Officers’ Trench. ‘C’ Squadron would be in reserve and support the attack with covering machine gun and rifle fire.
On 6th August Major William Glasgow of the 2nd L.H. Regiment was moved to C.O. 1st L.H. Regiment to replace Major Vernon, who had been ordered away on sick leave on the 31st July.
6th – 7th August, 1915
Throughout the evening of the 6th August the noise of bloody hand-to-hand fighting at Lone Pine rang out in the darkness. The battle would continue for three days and losses would amount to over 2,000 Australians. The attack on Steele’s had failed to shut down German Officers’ Trench and massed machine gun fire could enfilade the entire line from Quinn’s, Pope’s and The Nek.
Monash’s 4th Brigade, the 29th Indian Brigades and the British New Army Battalions had lost their way in the maze of ‘deres’ and were miles away from their objective. At 3.30am the New Zealand troops were well behind schedule and 500 yards from Chunuk Bair. The attack on Baby 700 was now unsupported from the rear and, in Birdwood’s words, “almost hopeless” [2].
The Turkish lines were bristling with machine guns with the power to enfilade the attacking troops from all directions. Neither ‘pre-condition’ had been met. Unless orders were given to the contrary the assaults from Russell’s Top, Pope’s and Quinn’s were to be delivered. Birdwood and Godley conferred – they knew the situation but ordered the attacks to proceed.
At 4am artillery fire from naval and land batteries bombarded Turkish trenches at the rate of one round every two and a half minutes. At the same time two mountain guns increased the firing rate to four – five shells per minute. In Bean’s words such bombardment had not been seen on the Gallipoli Peninsula since May 2nd: “the positions behind it became an inferno, the dark-brown dust of the shell-bursts dimly visible in the grey light, rolling in clouds across the face of the hill and shutting out all view from any distance.” [5] Whether through poor synchronization or lack of precision of time pieces, firing stopped at 4.23am, – cut short as if ‘by a knife’- seven minutes before troops were to break out. The element of surprise had been lost as precious minutes ticked by. The order was to go …
“At that instant there broke out such a rattle of rifle and machine-gun fire as was never heard before. Into that fusillade our men went out…” [6]
Lieutenant Geoffrey Harris of 1st L.H.Regiment “B” Squadron led his troop into the attack via Waterfall Gully
“At 3.30am … I fell in my little party of twelve bomb throwers and twelve riflemen with fixed bayonets in support. The latter had orders not to fire a shot without orders, but to use the cold steel. We marched silently down our communication trenches to the gully …then up to the waterfall, (which we scaled), to be met by a shower of Turkish bombs before we had time to get into any sort of order. I immediately gave the order to charge and we took the two lines of trenches…. Meanwhile ‘A’ Squadron, seeing that we had been forced to show our hand, went over … in the first ten minutes ‘A’ Squadron was practically put out of action – over 50 per cent were killed or wounded in the first rush. … it was just breaking daylight when we went over the hill to be met by the crescent trench, full of Turks, half out their trench, waiting for us. Machine guns were barking on three sides of us. I gave the order “Down!” and went to earth just as a bullet hit my shoulder. Sergeant Ellis went down on my right – killed instantly, riddled with bullets at close range …I found a lot of Turkish bombs and secured two prisoners. Five men came up to my support and we had a bomb fight with the Turks for over an hour … Major Glasgow, Lt. Nettleton, and Lt. Weir with 16 men came up to help us. At 8a.m. after we had consolidated our position and used up 1100 bombs sent up to us from Brigade, we were ordered to retire as our position was untenable. When we reached our regimental lines I received orders to fall in all men left of ‘A’ and ‘B’ Squadrons and get them into line with ‘C’ Squadron. All I could muster was 32 men of which 24 were wounded. Others came in, but very few. In the morning we went out 199 strong.” [7]
1st Australia Light Horse Regimental Diary [9]
Saturday 7th August 1915
POPE’S POST
General attack by our forces along the whole line. Our attack was made at 4.30am from Pope’s Hill on the Chessboard and the trenches North of Bloody Angle. The attack was gallantly led by Major J.M. Reid. The storming party rushed the third line of trenches occupied about 30 yards of them and held them for 2 hours but the enemy attacked with great force.
They severely bombed the forward party and forced them to retire. Lt Harris displayed great gallantry in leading the first line of the storming party and although wounded remained in the foremost position gained until the retirement. Corporal Keys, Private Tancred, Private Barrow, [all of ‘C’ Squadron that was in reserve], displayed great bravery in carrying bombs to the storming party over ground swept by machine gun and rifle fire.
Charles Bean captured the events of the early morning: “It is said that the gallant Reid, being hit in the right hand, changed his revolver to his left, and, although entreated to go to the rear, continued to lead his men. He was last seen amid the bomb-smoke in the enemy trench … for sheer self-sacrifice and heroism this charge of the Australian Light Horse is unsurpassed in history.” [10]
Unlike at The Nek, where 3rd Light horse Brigade commanders sent wave after wave of soldiers to their deaths, Brigadier General Chauvel could see from Quinn’s the slaughter of his Light Horsemen and, in consultation with Major Bourne and Lieutenant Colonel Stoddard, a ‘stop’ order was given.
Casualties were high …
In the 1st L.H.Regiment Major Reid and Lieutenant Nettleton and 56 other ranks, initially reported by the Regiment as ‘missing’, were killed. Captain Cox with leg and arm broken and Lieutenant Tinson, whose legs were partly blown away by a bomb, crawled into Pope’s twenty-four hours after the attack. Both died. Captain Holman and Lieutenants Reid, White, MacMillan, Stewart, Weir, Harris and 87 other ranks were wounded.
For the Regiment casualties totalled 159 of the 200 men that went out. More died on the following days from injuries received during the offense. The names of those killed in action on 7th August are listed at the end of this chapter.
1st Australia Light Horse Regimental Diary [9]
Sunday 8th August 1915
POPE’S POST
The 1st Light Horse Regiment was on duty at Pope’s.
The following men died and were buried at sea from wounds received in action on the 7th August: Lance Corporal Frederick Gordon Crisp, Trooper George Hills, Trooper Robert James Joseph Perrau and Trooper Eric William Magee.
The total numbers of Australian Casualties for the August Offensive were high: Lone Pine 2,277 (Turks 5,000 – 7,000), The Nek 327, Pope’s Post 159, Quinn’s Post 49, Chunuk Bair 6,000 – a total of 8,812. The total dead and wounded for the Allies was 20,155 and 12,000+ for the Turks.
Fallen Brothers
Among those killed in action on the 7th August were Troopers Frank and Stanley Villis, sons of Isabella and Edward Villis of Northcote Street, Cessnock NSW. Twenty-four year old Frank enlisted in the 1st L.H.Regiment on 22nd August, 1914. He trained at Rosebery and embarked on the “Star of Victoria” on October 20th 1914. Twenty-two year old Stanley enlisted in the 7th L.H.Regiment on the 15th October, 1914. On 3rd March, 1915 he transferred to the 1st L.H. Regiment that was based at Heliopolis. Both landed at Anzac Cove on 12th May, 1915. On 7th August Frank and Stanley together charged the Turkish lines at the Chessboard. They were listed “Missing” and their bodies were never recovered. Their sacrifice is remembered on the Lone Pine Memorial.
Troopers Frederick Hector and Harold Samuel Sherwood enlisted in the 3rd Reinforcements 1st L. H. Regiment in December 2014. Frederick aged 30 and Harold 24 years listed their Next of Kin as Mr S Sherwood Snr, and Mrs Mary Sherwood of Playford, Ipswich, England. They were taken on strength to the 1st L.H. Regiment on 15th July, 1915. Both brothers were listed “Killed in action” at Pope’s Hill on 7th August and their graves lie side by side in Quinn’s Post Cemetery.
7th August Honour Roll, 1st Light Horse Regiment [12]
This article is based on Chapter 11 and 12 of Anne Flood’s book “In the Footsteps of the First: 1st Australian Light Horse Regiment”. This book tells the story of the 1st Light Horse Regiment, her grandfather Trooper Frederick Henry Wood’s Regiment, at Gallipoli through the words of the commanders and men of the 1st Light Horse Regiment. Trooper Wood was wounded GSW to the right leg on June 1 while in action at Pope’s Post. He returned to Australia in December 1915 however his heart and thoughts were always foremost with the mates that he left behind.
Endnotes
1. AWM H15753 Copyright AWM
2. Bean, C., Official History Chapter XVI The Plan of the Second Offensive p.464
3. Perry, R., (2009). The Australian Light Horse Brigade. Ch. 16 Insanity at the Nek. Hatchette: Sydney Australia. 2009. p.104
4. AWM C02699 Copyright AWM
5. Bean, C., Official History Chapter XXI The Feints of August 7th p.612
6. Bean, C.,. Sydney Morning Herald, 27th August, 1915, p.9
7. Harris, G.H.L., ‘True to Name: Bloody Angle’, Reveille, 1.8.1932, p.22
8. AWM H00356 Copyright AWM
9. 1st Australian Regiment Unit Diary August, 1915 WM4 10/6/4 – August 1915
10. Bean, C., Official History. Chapter XXI The Feints of August. p.625
11. Major James Moffat Reid, Lieutenant Oswald Bruce Ryrie and Major Hugh Venables Vernon in a dugout Pope’s Hill May, 1915. Courtesy of the Vernon Family Collection
12. Flood, A., (2013). “In the Footsteps of the First: 1st Australian Light Horse Regiment” Triple D Books: Wagga Wagga NSW. p.p. 113 – 116. Sourced from Honour Roll, Embarkation Rolls 1st Australian Light Horse Regiment and other sources.